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EMPLOYMENT, WAGES, ANDUNIONISMIN A MODEL OF THE
AGGREGATELABOR MARKET IN BRITAIN
ABSTRACT
Two propositions figure prornir.ently in exDianatons for Srttas
comparatively low growth in employment:first, the wage—setting
mechanism is insufficiently responsive to the growth of nemnp1oymnent
and. seccnd, there exists a well—defined negative causal relaticnship
fromwagesto employment with the features of a conventional labor
demand function.Using aggregate annual observations from 1953 to 1979,
find the evidence for a conventional labor demand curve to be fragile
andfind little support for the notion that trade union objectives are
unaffected by unemployment as some versions of the "insider—outsider"
hypothesis would maintain.In general, the empirical results in this
paper emphasize that confident inferences about Britain's employment





Britain's discouraging recori on employment during the last 15
years or so has resulted in the revival of the classical explanation for
unep1oyment:wages have been consistently above market-clearing levels
and employers have responded by moving back on their labor demand
schedules.This explanation in various guises has figured in many
accounts of the growth in unemployment including those in government
publications and in academic treatises.!"The heart of this explanation
consists of' two propositions:first, the wage—setting mechanism is
insufficiently responsive to the growth of unemployment and, second,
there exists a well—defined negative causal relationship from wages to
employment with the features of a conventional labor demand curve.The
purpose of this paper is to present evidence relevant to both of these
propositions.
The second proposition is the focus of the research reported in
the first part of the paper.There is no doubt that, given the
.11 Forexample,H.N1.Treasury (98S),Bruno and Sachs(985),and
Minford (l983).—2—
resources available to economists, it is feasible toorganizethearuaI
movementsin wages and employment in postwar Britatn insuch3way- th.t
theyconform to something akin to labor demand function.utict
beingpresent at the discovery of this demand function, the reader't.s
normally left uninformed of the trail followed by the researcher tn
exploringand ultimately locating the function and hence it s dtffiout
todiscern whether this employment—wage relationship i readily apparent
or its detection requires subtle and sensitive management of' the data.
Conseuently, it is impossible to know how much confidence to place in
theconcept of an aggregate demand function for labor.
This paper presents an array of'empiricalresults that might be of
assistance in evaluating the robustness of'theaggregate wage—employment
relationship.In tact, quite early in my examination of this issue,I
stunibledupon a formulation with the appearance ofa conventional labor
demand function, but Ithen found it to be a delicate being, one that
wassensitive to small changes in specification.It is not a
relationship that the data ef'f'ortlessly conform to.
Having thus ientifie a relationship that (though not robust) has
claim to be labelled a labor demand function,I build upon this a wage-
3ettirlg ode1 that affords an opportunity to evaluate the other
proposition behin the popular story for the growth in unemployment, the
froposition that the mechanism determining wages is urresponsive with
respect to unemployment.In tact, given the manner in which I
characterize the wage—setting process, this proposition takes the rorm
of examining whether, in pursuing their wage and employment objectives,—3—
tradeunions take account of the unemployrent rate.This is r-e1ate t
the "insider—outsider" hypothesis that has become popular in recent
years../I express this proposition in such 3aythat it turn5 on the
value assumed by a parameter of the trade union's objective functionand
Iestimate this Parameter with aggregate time—series data.Though aairi
unequivocal judgments are not permitted, the point estimates suggest the
goals of British unions have been sensitive to the level of
unemployment.
Taken as a whole, the empirical work in this paper surely suggests
that aggregate British time—series observations do not allow confident
inferences to be drawn about two propositions central to the classical
unemployment hypothesis.This does not necessarily negate this
hypothesis:Britain's wage—setting procedures are decentralized and the
characterization of trade union wage pressure impeding the growth of
employment might be accurate in many labor markets and yet it is somehow
camouflaged in the aggregate data.This is both a plausible and
testable proposition.However,disaggregatedstudies are unusual and
most studies (including this one) draw inferences from aggregated
data.These data can certainly be organized to provide support for a
particular characterization of the workings of the British labor market,
but it should be recognized these are primarily exercises in
calibration, that is, quantifying the tnagnitude of presumed
relationships.The aggregate data leave ample room for doubt about the
exi5tence of these relationships.
Forreferencestotheliteratureonthe"insider—outsider"
hypothesis as well as a useful analysis, see Carruth and Oswald (1987).—)4—
II.The Determinants of Employment
A. Introduction
The purpose of this section is to report the results c esttmatg
equations that might be interpreted as aggregate employment demand
functions.It is appropriate to spell out my procedures here because
some respects they differ from those followed by some other researchers
on these issues.First, the emphasis of this section is not one of
measuring the magnitude of presumed relationships.Rather, the ernp'nasis
is on deterniningwhether an eno1oyent equation can beestirmated that
bears the characteristics of a stylized demand function.In other
words,I do not presume the existence of a negative sign on wages in an
equation accounting for movements in aggregate employment, but instead I
ascertain what has to be done to generate this result.The more
convoluted and contorted the specification of the equation ultimately
generating the appearance of a conventional labor demand function, the
less plausible is such a construct.
Now, of course, given the cost of computing time nowadays and
given the availability ot observations on more and more variables, there
is absolutely no doubtthat a diligent researcher will in due course
unearth an equation desplaying the features of a labor demand function
even it the data have to be skillfully arranged and perhaps
misrepresented to do so.The most natural way of achieving this goal is
to aunent a naive labor demand function (that is, one containing only
relative prices and an aggregate demand variable) with variables that do
notappear in textbook labor demand functions, but whose presence can be-5—
rationalized by an imaginative researcher.For instance, at ne time or
another, purportedly employment demand functions have been estimated
that include as regressors the number of strikes, normal weekly hours of
work, a smoothed series on the gross capital stock, the devtation of
world trade from a trend, and the adjusted public sector deficit as a
percentage of potential gross domestic product../Usually, quite
ingenious explanations are provided for the inclusion of these variables
and I am not going to argue that, in some sense, researchers have been
ill-advised to augment naive labor demand equations with these
variables.
What I would argue is, first, it is often not clear whether the
presence of these auxiliary variables is necessary for the rest of the
equation to give the appearance of a conventional labor demand function
and, second, the usefulness of the pristine labor demand function is
compromised if it requires for its application the constancy of a whole
string of other variables about which economic analysis has sometimes
little to say.In other words, the inclusion of te auxiliary variables
is not a matter of truth or falsehood; it is an issue of usefulness for
understanding and organizing economic phenomena.If an exogenous
increase in real wages depresses employment, but only if strikes, work
hours, the capital stock, world trade, and government's budget deficit
3_I'Thestrikes and hours of work variables are used by Symons (982) in
his study ofBritish manufacturing industry while the other variables
appear in Layard and Nickell (1986).Layard and Nickell's world trade
variableissupposedtomeasure"realdemand relativetopotential
output."Why is the volume of transactions any more a demand than a
supply variable and,inany event,how doesthe volume of exchanges
enter a demand function?—6—
areheld Constant, then perhaps we should be diverting more research
resources into understanding the movements of the auxiliary varia1es
and less into real wages../Consequently, in this study,I shall e
investigating the degree to which the aggregate data on employment and
other variables conform to a naive, unaugtnented, labor demand function.
A
word on identification is needed.If emp1oynent and real dages
do not trace out the negative relationship implied y a naive demand
function, the rnost natural response is to invoke the identification
problen:a positive employment—wage association reflecting labor supply
decisions has interfered with the negative slope implied by the labor
demand functton.I believe this is not a persuasive objection in the
context of the British labor market.First, standard exclusion
restrictions are applied to lend support to the interpretation of the
relationship as a demand function.!Second, in a highly unionized
economy such as Britain's, I am extremely sceptical of the relevance to
most labor markets of a model whereby the wage is set through the
intersection of a conventional upward—sloping labor supply function and
a conventional downwards1oping demand function.Surely, a more
appropriate characterization is a recursive one whereby wages are set by
ur1ion5 employers, or the representatives of government through
collective bargaining procedures and, with wages t1us determined, firms
make their employment decisions.In this event, the a priori case for
I maintain that what economists have contributed to an understanding
of movements over time in normal hours of work is meagre and that with
respect to strikes not much more.
In particular, variables such as the level of unemployment benefits
areexcluded from the equation determining employment.—7—
the observations on employment and real wages mapping cut a 1aor eran
f'unctionseems much more compelling.In such an economy, a labcr' 3up21Y
relationshipmay involve the size of' the labor force and wages: that i.,
an tncrease in real wages may raise the number of' people who would li<e
to be employed on these terms and thiswill bemanifested in an
expansion of'thelabor force.This paper also reports the results frorr
somesirnple specifications of' this relationship.
B. Estimates
Thespecif'ication for ag'egate employment f'romwhich Istart is
as f'ollows:
2 2 2 (1+v)w r
ea0 + a1i( m +a2(;)t +ay
iO
+ae_ + a5T+a6T+u1
Alllower case letters denote natural logarithms of' the variables.The
logarithm of' employment ise, money wagesw, the payroll tax ratev,
the prices of raw materials and f'uelsm, the user cost of' capitalr,
and real disposable incomey.A time trend ts given byTtandult
repesentsa stochastic disturbance.The a's are parameters to be
estimated.Descriptive statistics on these and other variables are
provided in Table 1.
Ihave in mind a situation in which f'irms choose their labor, raw
material,energy, and capital inputs to maximize their prof'its given
inputprices(including wages set by collective bargaining or some sort—8—
Tabi. 1
Definitiona of Variable! and Deucriptive Statisticz, 1953—79
Original Standard
VriabL.* eart Deviation
E •eploy.esin .mployni.nt (tlliors) 22.19 0.66
Z •totalworkingpopulation (laborforce)(milliona) 22.74 0.88
Uindex of wag.e 171.2 144.4
M —pric.index oft.rials and fuels 145.3 108.7
R —u.rcoCt of capital 1256.7 1384.1
—r..ldisposable income 211.8 58.5
K —gros.capital stock at 1975 replacement cost 356.3 97.0
V —ind.xof payroll x rat. (19751) 0.936 0.0425
S •ind.xof indirect tax rtt. (1975=1) 1.016 0.0161
I —inco.taxrtt. 0.169 0.035
C —mdixof real un.mployi.nt b.n.fit. 36.81 10.21





U Z—E —numb.run.p1oy.d 0.53 0.36
U/Zui.ploy.rt rRt. 0.024 0.015
e •mE 3.099 0.030
• 3.123 0.039
(1+v)w1n1+y)W) 4.622 0.309
(1—i)w/(1+.)p .I((i—I)w/(i+s)e) —0.246 0.201





Not..:Ob,ervatjoneon p.raonldi3pobl.inco.,retail prices,omployent and the
workingpopulationare taken fromisueioftb. AnnlAbstrctof Stati2tlcs(Central
StatisticalOffics). Tb.us.rcoltofcapital,R,is d.fin.d as (R+ 0.05)*P)
wh.r.Ria th. av.rtg. yield on 2.5 perc.nt Consola andPis th, price index of the
output of iroi and .t..l indu.triee.Ob..rv&tiona onPand Rare drtwn tromthe
Anrnl Ab*trtct of Sttistic..Re.l dtipo..bI. inco. i!nomirtal dieposableincome
divid.d by th. rt.il pric. index.Obe.rvation. on .11th. other varitbies are taken
from th.ta app.ndixto Nick.ll and Andr.w. (1983).—9—
of regulation) and given a downward—sloping demand function for their
output.The price of output is thus not exogenous, but varIables that
shift that demand function (especially consumers disposable inccme may
be assumed to be so.The quadratic time trend may be rationalized i
tenns of the effects of technical progress although, of course, it
incorporatesthe effects of any time—correlated omitted variables.
the absence of a compelling economic model, the case for complicated
trends is unconvincing.Indeed, even a quadratic time trend is a little
disconcerting and I should be more comrortable with the estimates if
they prove to be independent of the presence of this trend.
Equation (1)is estimated with annual data for Britain from 1953
to 1979.The estimation technique is instrumental variables where
current and lagged wages and lagged employment are treated as
endogenous.Wages are endogenous Insofar as wage and employment
decisionsare made jointly.Treating lagged employment as predetermined
would seem most inappropriate given the fact that relevant determinants
of employment are almost certainly omitted form equation ()andthese
omitted regressors affect employment in earlier years.The empirical
application of almost any behavioral model of the dynamic demand for
inputs will imply that lagged values of the inputs are jointly
determined with the current values.I am well aware a case can be made
for treating disposable income as endogenous and, indeed, some equations
were fitted allowing for this possibility.The implications from this
inquiry were not meaningfully different from those reported.The lag on
the regressors in equation (1) are conventionally justified in terms of_i 0—
some(usually unspecified)costs ofadjustments.Unfortunately, oni'
under the most restrictive of conditions i11 adjustnent cost rnoie]s
yield explicit expressions in which the lagged values of the regressors
with corresponding fixed coefficients accurately embody the effects of
such adjustment costs.
The consequences of fitting equation (1) are shown incolumn of
Table2 and the estimates in the other columns show the consequences of
smallchanges in the specification.Thus the estimates in columns 1and
2provide support for restricting the effect of lagged employment to two
years.Conventional t—tests allow us to dispense with contefnporaneous
disposable income and lagged values of the ratio of the prices of
capital to raw materials.Columns 3,4,5, and 6 present, therefore,
more parsimonious versions of equation (1)in which negative and
significant (by conventional standards) effects of current and lagged
real wages on employment are measured.
These estimates provide empirical support for the notion of a
conventtonal employment demand function as applied to the aggregate
British economy.But, unfortunately, this is not a robust relationship,
one that survives small alterations in specification.For instance,
column 7ofTable 2 simply removes the quadratic time trend from the
specitication in column 6 and our confidence in the negative effects of
real wages on employment is immediately challenged as is our inference
about the effect of energy and raw material prices on employment.Or,
to provide another indication of the lack of robustness of these
results, the estimates in column 8 omitet_2from the specification in—11—
Table 2Inatr.fltal iri.bl. Eetie.t.. of Eqaiton (1)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
¶804 3745 3.466 3.141• 3.324 3.352 0.1 1.064
(3.901) (3.,6e) (0.748) (0.619) (0.611) (0.613) (0.274) (0.64(
—0.060 —0.061 -C.076• —0.057• —0.046• —0.048• -.0.010 -0.051
(0.042) (0.039) (0.031) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.029) (c.2)
—0.122 —0.127 ..0.168 —0.12 —0.152 -.0.149' —0.025 —0.C63
(0.089) (0.079) (0.037) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034)
—0.003 —0.028 —0.064 —O.070• —0.070 —0.083• 0.010 —0.011
(0.121) (0.108) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (o.)
—0.070 —0.074 —0.109' —0.094 -.0.09 —0.089' -.0.013 —0.025
(0.084) (0.075) (0.027) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023)
0.037 0.002 0.031 0.013 0.016
(0.040) (0.051) (0.026) (0.014) (0.014)
-.0.001 0.002 -.0.016
(0.025) (0.02 (0.019)
0.064 -.0.012 0.07 0.055
(0.077) (0.101) (0.056) (0.050)
0.303 0.335 0.34• 0.343 0.383k 0.395 0.253 0.357'
(0.118) (0.10) (0.069) (0.066) (0.057) (0.056) (0.075) (0.095>
—0.272 —0.309' —0.224 —0.201 -.0.206 —0.210 —0.20 —0.24
(0.099) (0.104) (0.055) (0.046) (c.347) (0.047) (0.075) (C.73)
1.089 1.085• O.82 0.B4a' 0.883 o.ea• 1.058. o.g8•
(0.547) (0.495) (0.41) (0.135) (0.133) (0.129) (0.199) (0.21)
—0.872 —1.074 —0.91& —0.963 —0.942 —0.927• —0.151





0.023 o.oe 0.041• 0.036• 0.042 0.044 0.013
(0.045) (0.040) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.309)
—0.0OO —0.0001 -.0.0010 ..0.00O9 —0.0009 —0.0009 —C.0003
(0.0010) (0.000) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002>
2.90 2.9t 2.6 4.56 .56 3.93 0.72
2.42 2.46 2.05 1.93 1.90 1.70 1.4 1.72
0.O05 0.0052 0.0049 0.0047 0.0049 0.0049 0.0086 0.0083
Not•Th. .etit.incol,a. 3 thogh8Irs fit.d to d. fro. 1953 to 197g.Tho.. in cO1..n 1 ta tartiflfl
194andthos.in co1ta. 2 Un•rting in1955.£stim.t.d .nd.rd•rror,an in p.nntnn...For .... of rndir.g,
Sn a.t.rifl *. bnn attached to co.ftici.nt. •.tit.d to I,. •tl.nt*ic. th.ir •nSfl •rror.. Th. in•ttuflntal
nri.bl,,u..d to ..tith.•qu.tions an m, t1' mt_2. r,rt..l.rt.2. (1.v), (1+v)_,,(1*v)_2.y
t—2'Cc1,c_2, (1.s), T• fld T.BPend.to ti,. !oz—Pi.r.Chi—Sq.. Stati.tic
CO.pUtovir*oyr n.idtl aut000rnlation•.DViitPDurbin—W.t.Cn statistic endinIttP.qLatir'I•fld*rd
Irrorof ..tit..—12—
column 6.Again, our inferences are immediately Surrounded with much
greater uncertainty.It is the effects of disposa1e tncome that tend
to be robust with respect to small changes in equation specification,
not the effects of wages.
A common assumption In this literature is that the services from
physical capital are predeterrined with respect to employment
decisions.I find the widespread use of this assumption quite
remarkable.Even if the stocks of buildings and machines were fixed,
their use is certainly not.However, what difference does it make to
our estimated employment equation If the user cost of capital is
replaced in equation (1) with a measure of the capital stock (whose
logarithm in yeartis given bykt)?This is answered by the
estimates in Table 3.A compelling case for a negative wage—elasticity
cannot be made from the estimates in Table 3 nor can a strong case be
made for employment being significantly affected by physical capital.
Henceforth, I maintain the assumption that the relevant regressor is the
user cost of capital.
C.Interpretation
Thereareseveralways in which to rationalize the more
parsimonious specification in columns 3,4,5, and 6 of Table 2.Oneis
the tollowin which starts with a static or desired (indicated by an
asterisk) demand for employmentTable 3 The Use of Capi1 Stock Regressor
Equation
1 2 3 4 5
Numbr
Constant 1.155 4.049 0.069 3.603 2.192
(2.413) (2.414) (0.353) (1.447) (1.279)
—0.012 —0.016 —0.037 —0.017 —0.046
(0.047) (0.053) (0.037) (0.036) (0.040)
((1+v)/)
1 —0.059 —0.026 —0.017 —0.032 —0.023
(0.044) (0.047) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040)
((1+v)w/)
2 0.014 0.010 0.020 0.006 —0.008
(0.039) (0.043) (0.030) (0.038) (0.038)
—0.176 0.266 —0.094 0.215 —0.235
(0.506) (0.536) (0.535) (0.455) (0.224)
—0.648 —0.464 —0.157 —0.679
(0.622) (0.694) (0.746) (0.560)
0.546 —0.394 0.252
(0.816) (0.824) (0.566)
0.083 0.034 0.082 0.067
(0.085) (0.093) (0.095) (0.085)
0.257 0.211 0.172 0.251 0.197
(0.106) (0.118) (0.120) (0.0%) (0.106)
-0.155 —0.136 —0.231 —0.173 —0.201
(0.122) (0.137) (0.094) (0.095) (0.097)
O.948 O.733 0.999k O.760 O.839
(0.246) (0.260) (0.246) (0.235) (0.231)
-0.764 -0.176 —0.010 —0.213 —0.159
(0.321) (0.260) (0.263) (0.227) (0.250)
0.705k
(0.266)
0.008 0.017 0.017 0.014
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
—0.0001 0.0001 —0.0001 —0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002)
2.28 2.69 3.9 2.08 2.30
1.43 1.78 1.70 1.60 1.G7
0.0074 0.0084 0.0093 0.0077 0.0081
Notse: Th. ar. inatrua.ntal variabls .atim.t.s wh.r. curr.nt and lagg.d valuie of gssandths c.pil stock and 1.gg.d valus. of •.ploymsnt ar, endog.noua arid whsre
th. tnstrum.nta sri thos.picifisd in th. Not.. to Tb1. 2.—1 4—
(1+v)w (1+v)w —) +( (2)e
— + m t 2 rnt—1+ 3mt+L't—i
+ + u2
and combines this with a partial adjustment equation of the form
(3) eAe +(l—X)ei+u3
whereU3tis serially correlated u3pu3_1 +c3.The implied




— )+X pX _____ r
+X1y1-
m t—2 3rnt 3mt'-
+X(5(1-p) + 2p6)Tt+x5(1-pT+ (1-A +
— p(1—X)e_2 + u
wherethe stochastictermutis a weighted sum ofu2tand
A different rationalization of the specifications estimated in
Table 2 involves characterizing anAR(2)process for the stocha5tic
tern inasimple static employment demand function, namely,
1(1+v)w r 2
e-+ 1 m +3rnt
+y +5Tt + 5Tt + u5t
u5 + +Th13 implies the following structural equation for employment:







+ 1-p1 -p2)+26( pl +2)
+ -Pi p2)T
+P1ei+ + u6t
where again the tocha3tic termu6tcombinesu5tand No
doubt, there are other ways to justify the specificationa in columns 3
through6 of Table 2,butthese two conatitute a mo3t ObViOu3 pair.
Todeterminethe empirical performance of equatlona (il) and (5),I
estimated both equation3 by nonlinear inatrumental variables treating
all money wage variables and lagged employment variables a
endogenous.On the ba15 of the results in Table ,thereis little to
choo3e between the3e two rationalizationsthe parameters of the
employment demand functlon3 are not mea3ured as well as those governing
the adju3thent or autoregre33ive proces3e3.With the influence of
di5po3able Income coming through quite clearly in equation (na), there
i3 perhap5 a 3lIght preference for the3e estimates and, indeed,I shall
be building on thi3 specification later.However, I do not claim that
one specification represent3 a demon3trably superior de3cription of the
data.—16—
Table4:Nonlinear Instrumental Variables Estir,ates






























III.A Structural Model of the Labor arket
A. Introduction
This section builds on the empirical findings earlier by offeririg
a structural model of wage and employment determination for the British
labor market.The purpose of this structural model is not merely to
give quantitative expression to a popular account of how wages and
employment are set in a highly unionized econony, but also to do so in
such a way as to shed light on what has become a fasionable view of the
nature of union objectives.This view holds that the objectives of
trade unions embrace the welfare of those currently employed, the so
called "insiders," and little or no weight is given to the un1p1oyed
who are "outsiders' to the wage determination process.Thus a negative
employment shock reduces the size of the union's constituency and they
will raise their wage demands to levels that make it unprofitable for
thefirm subsequently to hire the unemployed.
This "insider—outsider" distinction in union objectives appears to
have won a number of adherents although this is notbecauseof frequent
orconvincing corroboration of its central assumptions or implications
with the evidence.Indeed, it runs counter to a long tradition of
working cla5ssolidarityin British trade unionisn where the welfare of
the unemployed frequently figures in the stated concerns of both the
union leadership and the rank—and—file,Of course, economists are
weaned at an early professional age of the fallacy that word.s
necessarily match behavior, but nevertheless most of us would feel more—18—
comfortableif our models' postulates were not quite at odds wtth the
way in which the actors thought they were behaving.
The model proposed and estinated here identifies tne"urion as
the leader in setting wages and 'the" employer as the follower in
determining employment.The strengths and weaknesses of this approach
have been discussed at length elsewhere althoughevidenceofits
eipiricalperformarceisrestricted to a small number of (sometimes
atypical) iabor markets.It is surelya plausiblecharacterization of
British labor markets where unions are often portrayed as having
considerable power in setting wages and where employers (or their
representatives) are allowed considerable discretion over the level of
employment.The attractive feature of this model for empirical
researchers is that it allows for a convenient solution to what might be
an intractable bargaining problem.
B. Specific Functional Forms
Suppose the union has objectives defined over real wages net of
taxes(1—i)w/(1+s)p, employmente, and the size of the labor force z,
where all the8evariablesareexpressedin natural logarithms.In
particular, posit the following expression for the goals of the union:
(6) r(w,e,z)- +1)8(e- -5+
where
- + +3t—19—
The£'5are stochastic terms incorporating omitted features of the
union's objectives.Of course, a meaningful definition of objectives
requires[(1—1)w/(1+s)P)t > ande — —
—1,et —zt Zn[1—(Ut/Zt)) —(U/Z)tand the unemployment rate
figures explicitly in the union's objectives.On the other hand, if
=0,the union cares about the employed only, the "insiders,' and th
sizeof' the employed relative to the labor force (I.e., the unemployment
rate) is not of its concern.The value of the parameter ,therefore,
suggests the importance that the "outside' unemployed play in union
objectives.Note also that by specIfying the reference level ot
wages, to depend upon past values of wages, we permit current wage
goals to be molded by experience in the manner ct' habit persistence
models of consumption.Thisforiu1at1onis also consistent with some
represertatioris of the role played in wage bargaining by "target" value8
or real wages.!The parameter eisclosely related to the cyclical
variability of employment relative to that of wages:a value of e
closeto zero implies greater variability of erployment while 0close
to unity implies greater variability of wages.
Aecording to the proposed bargaining model, the employer
determines employmentsubject to the wage rate set by the trade union.
Supposethe employment demand function is that represented by equation
(2) aunented by the partial adjustment equation (3)wherethe error
term in that partial adjustment equation is serially correlated. n
See, for instance, Sargari (1980).Note that the lagged value of
wages is treated asgiven when current wages are determined implying
that the unions are characterized here as not solving an intertemporal
problem that recognizes the evolution oftheirwage objectives.—20—
addition to allowing firms to adjust employment inresponse to the wage,
let us al3o permit an adjustment from the labor force (whose logarithm
in yeartis denotedZt) as given by the following equations:
(7) z*
— +s1((:)+ + u7
where
(8) z, +(l—)zt1+u
One would expect that, other things equal, higher real wages induce an
expansion of the labor force so that >0.The variablect
measures the (logarithm of the) real value of unemployment benefit8 30
that, becauseZtincludes the unetployed, one might expect fewer of
the unemployed would drop out of the labor force when these benefits
take on higher real value3 soS2is conjectured to be positive.The
partial adjustment equation (8) rationalizes the important role played
by one—year lagged value3 of the labor force in accounting for movements
inZtin in3trumental variable regressions.Indeed, this
specification wa3 3elected in much the same way that the structural
employment equation waa chosen:instrumental variable regressions were
fitted relating z to current and lagged values of real wages and of
realun1ployment benefits and to lagged values of the dependent
variable.Some of these regressions are reported in AppendixTable A.
Anexamination ofthese results will show that, in anequation
accountingfor movements in the labor force,apowerful case cannot be
madefor regressors other than contenporaneous values of wage5 and
unemployment benefits and one—year laggedvalue3of the labor force.Thus this model of the ag'egate ]abor rarket characterizes gages
as being set by a trade union in accordance with the objective f'unction
givenby equation (6) and with ernploymner-it and thelaborf'orc erespor.i
in the manner described by equations (2) and (3) and by equations (7)
and (B) respectively.The following equations for real wages,
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— AB(1—A+p)e_1 4-&p(l—A)e_2 + e(1—)zt +-22—
























whereA -(A1-S1)1.In equations (9), (10), and (11), the
stochastic terms,'and represent linear combinations of
theunobserved components 2t 3t' u2t, 3t' t'
andu8t.Note
also that, becauseet —z——(U/Z)t,the negative of'theunecnployment
rate, subtracting equation (11) from equation (10) yields anexpression
for movements in the unemployment rate.
These equations are long and tedious, but (appearances tothe
contrary) not difficult to comprehend.Though highly nonlinear in
parameters, they are linear inthelogarithms of the variables.They
simplify considerably if the structural parameters assumeparticular
values.Thus the absence of serial correlation in the residualsof the—2'—
employment adjustment equation (that is,p=0)disposes of thegei
values of exogenous variables while, in addition, the irnediate
adjustment of employment and the labor force (that is, A=Iand
1, respectively) eliminates their lagged values.If the
unemployment rate does not figure in the union's objectives (that is,t'
0), not merely are wages and employment independent of the exogenous
variables in the labor force equation, but also (A1)1and the
equations become far less involved.
Throughout a critical role is played by8, the exponent on real
wages in the union's objective function.To illustrate this, consider
an exogenous variable in the employment demand function equation (2),
say, the lagged value of real disposable income, yt—1.According to
equations (9), (10), and (11), lower values of 5corresnd to smaller
absolute values of the elasticities of real wages and of the labor force
with respect to disposable income while lower values of 5are
associated with a larger absolute value of the elasticity of employment
with respect to disposable income.Hence the widely—held belief that
wages are less variable over the business cycle than employment would
imply a value of 9closer to zero than to unity.For this reazon,0
ha3beenlabelled the union's relative aversion to variations in
eiployment,L' a higher value of 5correspcnding to 'eater cyclical
wage variability and smaller employment variability in response to
exogenous shifts in the employment demand function.
This term was used in Pencavel and Holmiund (1988) and, of course,
italludestothedefinitionofrelativeriskaversionbecause
9 ——e(2r/e2)/(r/e). This interpretation of e(thoughnot the
term) is offered also by Jackman (1985) and Pencavel (1984).—25—
B. zt1matesoftheModel
stimatesof the structural parairieters of eguatoris(9'),(1.0), and
(11) are contained in Table 5.At first, full information axirnurn
likelihood r1iethods were used to calculate the parameters, but these
often involved a great deal of programming time which is a hindrance if
the researcher is interested inexar1iiningthe consequences ofanur1iber
of different specifications.For this reason,Iturned to nonlinear
three—stage least squares (asymptotteally equivalent to full intormation
maximum likelihood) where the estimating equations consisted of the
first—order conditionotthe constrained maxinurn o the union's
objective function and the two constraints, the employment and labor
forceequations../itisthese system three—stage least squares
estimatesthat are contained in Table 5.
The estimates In column (I) of Table 5 are those corresponding to
the form of the model expressed in equations (9), (10), and (11). A
number of variations on this specification were also estimated.For
Instance,the estimates in column (ii)correspond to the omission of
Tobe 3peclfic, the wage equation takes the following form:
(1-i)w
2 (1-i)w




where isa weighted sumof C2t,andC3t.The employment
equation is given by equation (J4) while the labor force equation is that
which results from the substitution of (7) into (8).—26—
Tabi,5Nonlin.ar Thr.•—Sag. Le.etSquare.E3tit,sor tre Scurrm.t.rs
Column(j) Column(ii) Column (iii) Columr (Iv)
8 —0.060 —0.041 —0.039 —0.013
ctiVa5 (0.088) (0.047) (0.045) (0.023)
0.640 0.905 0.945 0.690
(0.541) (0.434) (0.444) (0.7a6)
0.483 0.275 0.145 0.963
(1.724) (1.379) (1.409) (2.512)
1.462k 1.496 1.505 1.480
(0.205) (0.202) (0.212) (0.210)
. —0.493k —0.540 —0.555k —0.498
2 (0.231) (0.228) (0.240) (0.237)
-0.001
(0.007)
Employment 2.766 2.534 2.528 2.263
° (1.255) (0.420) (0.020) (0.807)
a —0.034 —0.030 —0.028 —0.033
1 (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.024)
—0.019 —0.054
2 (0.021) (0.031)
a —0.022 —0.016 —0.020 —0.054
•(0.023) (0.022) (0.026) (0.041)
0.183k 0.157 0.167 0.279
(o.o) (0.052) (0.060) (0.106)
a —0.023 —0.006 —0.009 —0.007
(0.068) (0.021) (0.030) (0.035)
0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
6 (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0007)
0.816k 0.797 0.735k 0.772*
(0.196) (0.204) (0.225) (0.257)
p 0.881 0.826 0.545 O.809
(0.168) (0.174) (0.187) (0.235)
LaborForce 4.251 3.191 3.193 3.123k
o(0.889) (0.020) (0.022) (0.o7)






Notsi!stiitid •.yptotic standard•rrora areinpar.nth.i...An aat.riak ha5 bean plAced
nxt to co.ffici.nta whoi. •itjrgt.d v.lu.sire at1.aittwici th.ir !tandard errora.-27-
lagged wages (that is, 20) fromthe employment denand functtor.,
equation (2), and to the omission of the real value of unenp1oyrnent
benefits (that 0)fromthe ]abor force equation (7).Inthis
form, each of the independent variables in the etployment denand
functionappears justonce white the labor force equation incorporates
the effects of real wages only.The estirnates in column (iii)irdio3te
there is no support ror extending the lag on real wages to threeyear"
while those in column (iv) correspond to a restricted version of the
model whereby the labor force is assumed to be independent of real
wages.An examination of Table 5 indicates relatively little variation
in the estimates of most parameters across columns and this was also the
case for the estimates corresponding to other modifications of the
estimating equations.There is good reason, therefore, to concentrate
on the estimates given in one of the columns in Table 5 and in what
follows I examine those reported in column (ii)
Considerfirst theestlriiates at'heparameters oftheunion's
objective function.The estimate of\of 0.91is close to unity and
significantly greater than zerothis is consistent with the notion
that, in forming its bargaining strategy, the union takes account of
unemploymentandit is inconsistent with the 'insider—outsider"
2/ Tobeprecise,theestimatesincolumn(iii)conformtothe
specificationof in equation (6) as
(1-1)w t J 1+-i + 3t—28—
hypothesis,at lea8t in the manner in which it ias been expressed in
this paper.The estimates of and 2(approxirnately1 .5 and-.5
respectively)imply a rising reference level for real wages that
ultimately fully erodes the utility enhancing effects of current real
wages increases.The estimate of 9of —O.O4 is insignificantly
different from zero and suggests an extreme aversion to variations
realwages in response to exogenous shocks and a corresponding tolerance
of variations in employment.Such an extrene result should clearly be
regarded with caution though, in its defence, it should be mentioned it
is con5istent with a common finding of relatively insensitive real wages
in Britain.For instance, in their analysis of wage movements in 19
OECD economies, Grubb, Jackman, and Layard (1983) identify Britain's
real wage as the most rigid.A similar result is reported in Klau and
Mittelstadt (1986).This is also the message being conveyed by our
est imat es.
The estimates in Table 5 of the parameters of the employment
demandfunction are broadly similar to those nonlinear least squares
results in column(14a)ot Table 14Otherthan the parameters
(Aandp)governing the adjustment and autoregressive process, only
the influence ofdisposable income (the coefficient comesthrough
clearly.Theelasticity of employment with respect torealwages is
small. (—0.03)and not estimatedprecisely.According totheestimate of
in column (ii)ot Table5,aten percent increase in real wages is
associated with a 1.7percentexpansion in the size of the labor force.—29—
Theimplicationsoftheestimates ofthestructural parametersin
column (ii) of' Table 5 for the reduced—form relatiorts for real ages,
employment, the labor force, and the unemployment rate are given t the
columnslabelled "solved N3SLS" in Table 6.Byway of comparison,in
the columns labelled 'OLSRF," Table 6 al3o reports the estimates
obtained from the simnpie application or ordinary least squares tothese
reduced—formequations.In general, the few degrees of freedom render
it extremely difficult to make confident inferences about the natureof
various relationships:there are 27 observatioris and 16 parameters
computed in the structural model represented in column (ii) of
Table 5.The consequence is a relatively large number of imprecisely
computed parameters.This is unavoidable if'oneemploysstructural
estimation at the macroeconomic level:specious statistical
significance can be achieved by fitting very parsimonious relationship3,
the simplicity of which cannot be justified normally on conventional
statistical criteria, or the relevance of many different variables can
be admitted with the conzequence (in a setting of relatively few
ob3ervation8)ot imprecise parameter estimates.
The resulting imprecision is clearly in evidence in thereal wage
equationsin Table 6:theonly terms of clear significance are lagged
real wages in the solved N3SLS equation.The difrerences inthe point
estiniates in the two coluins for real wages are not, in fact, very
meaningful,the standard errorsaccompanying each point estimate usually
spanthe corresponding point estimate in the other column.Given the
extraordinary attention given to the role of wages in affecting—30—
Table 6:ReducedFore Equations For 'eel idsges•!rnplovnient,the labor inn., and toeven,ploynenn net,
los)p3t et ot —
Solved Solved Solved Solved
SURF 8301.8 SURF 9351.5 005RF 9051.8 0L59F 030.S
Constant —4.879 0.350 0.246 0.339 0.643 0.595° 0.077 0.co°
(3.802) (0.847) (2.472) (0.259) (0.721) (2.236) (0.451)
(i—i),
—0.142 —0.019 0.056° 0.024 0.050 —0.001 —0.006 (lov)(1.s;pt (0.144) (0.323) (0.318) (0.018) (0.027)(c_cd) (0.01") 0.0's)
0.152 —0.016 —0.091° 0.020 —0.074° —0.001 0.017 —0.021 t-0 (0.177) (0.020) (0.022) (0.017) (0.034) (0.001) (0.021)(0.01")
[t) 0.136 0.010 —0.054° —0.013 —0.051° 0.000 0.003 0.05 at (0.107) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020) (o.ooi ( (0.013)c.oi€)
Ct) 0.003 —0.008 0.047' 0.010 0.072° —0.000 0.025° —0.011
(0.097) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (o.oie( (0.000) (0.011) (0.012)
0.792 —0.099 0.499° 0.127* 0.401° —0.003 —0.095 —0.130°
(0.436) (o.io5( (0.054) (0.039) (0.083) (0.004) (0.052) (0.041)
2t—2 —0.048 0.382 —0.043 —0.105° —0.141 0.003 .0.094° 0. 109°
(0.390) (0.091) (0.048) (0.044) (0.074) (0.003) (0.046) (0.045)
—0.014 0.001 0.021° —0.001 0.014° 0.000 —0.007 0.00'
(0.032) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002)
0.0005 —0.0000 —0.0006° 0.0000 —0.5004° —0.0000 0.0002° —0.0001
(0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0001) (o.oooi) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0005)
—0.118 1.557° —0.250° —0.037 —0.243° 0.048° 0.006 0.095°
(i.s)pt—1
(0.589) (0.242) (0.073) (0.027) (0.112) (0.023) (0.070) (0.055)
—0.426 —0.562° —0.213° 0.013 .0.045 —0.017 0.161° —0.031 (los(pt—2 (0.520) (0.250) (0.065) (0.011) (0.099) (0.011) (0.062) (0.019)
0.894 —0.819 0.241 1.049° —0.004 0.025 —5.239 —t.0Th1°
(1.584) (0.820) (0.197) (0.125) (0.301) (0.027) (0.188) (0.130)
't—2 —0.519 0.134 —0.376° —0.171 —0.252 0.004 3.142 0.15
(0.769) (0.166) (0.096) (0.144) (0.146) (0.006) (0.091) (3.147)
—0.701 0.590 0.411° —0.014 0.'03° 0.838° 0.280 0.952°
(1.619) (0.709) (0.201) (0.019) (0.307) (0.071) (0.192) (0.080)
92
0.993 0.976 0.999 0.933 0.994 0.709 0.082 0.088
8? 5.34 1.15 6.16 4.48 5.72 30.7 1.55 1.95
08 2.07 2.34 2.86 1.48 2.66 0.21 2.50 1.09
see 0.0235 0.0317 0.0029 0.0080 0.0045 0.0215 0.0028 0.0050
lnteszThe92in theSalved830th noluen is the square of the nn.ffinlent of correlationb.tooentie actualcci...:
the left—tend side varlsble and the values predicted by the unset noshlvatinn of right—handsidevsrinhle,.-31—
unaploytnent,it may be worth noting that the solved N3SLS estirnates of
thecoefficientson lagged wages imply that a 10 percent higher level of
wagesraises the unemploymentrate yaboutthree percentage poiflts.
However,it is quite evident that this effect is measured quite
imprecisely
IV.Conclusion
This paper examined the nature and meaning of the association
between wages and employment in the aggregate British labor market
between 1953 and 979.My purpose was to determine what had to be done
,iththese arid other variables so that they take on the appearanceofa
conventionallabor demand function.In so doing,I imposed relatively
little prior structure on the empirical expression of the textbook labor
demandcurve.Having arrived at a plausible though not a robust
relationship between e1ploytnent and wages,I built upon this a
structural model of the determination of wages, employment, and the
labor force, and therefore, of the unemployment rate.This model was
designed in such a way as to evaluate the empirical relevanceof the
populardistinctionbetween "insiders' and "outsiders" in the
12!Theeffects of lagged employment, et_l.and of the lagged labor
force, on the unemployment rate in the solved N3SL.S column should
be treated with caution.The implied coefficients onet_andZt_l
are insignificantly different from unity.But there is an approximate
identityinvolvingcurrentvaluesoftheunenploymentrate,the
logarithm of employment, and the logarithm of the labor force, natnely
(u/z)t: etzt.Hence, except for the fact that the lagged values of
employmentand the labor force appear in the reduced—form unemployment
rate equation, these estimates may be simply mapping an identity!-32-
formulationof union objectives.In fact, the point estimates o this
modelo not lend much support to the insider—outsider distinction
although the standard errors surrounding these point estimates render
confident inferences unwarranted.
Giventhe imprecision of these estimates, a consequence of using a
relativelyshort time series and obviously a problem not resolved by
exploiting quarterly or monthly data instead of annual observations, a
natural response is to forego structural estimation and to fit reduced
form equations exclusively.This is an old andcomplicated Issue in
applied economics.My major difficulty with this position is that
reducedformequations rarely provide information that effectively
discriminatesamong competing hypotheses and imaginative economists can
think of several different explanations consistent with the results.
Structural estimation is usually necessary (though not always
sufficient)toist1nguish among these different explanations.And when
thedata are insufficiently rich, we simply haveto confess
agnosticism.Indeed, the most salient teature of the empirical work
here is the fact that the various relationships computed with agegate
data are sensitive to specification or are estimated imprecisely.In
either event, the data are signalling to the researcher that they cannot
deliver unambiguou5answersto the sort of questions economists ask of
them.This calls for scepticism whenever researchers claim unequivocal
resultsfran using these data to measure structural relationships.-33—
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ApperdiXTable A
ESuatiorsAcCOUfltiflRfor the Anrua1 Movernerts
irtheatur1Logarithmof the Working ?opu1atior(z)
Equtiort
1 2 3 4
Numb.z
Corstart 0.581 0.408 0.474 0.324 O.471
(0.555) (0.396) (0.330) (0.294) (0.232)
((1_i)W) 0.118 0.105 0.072 0.133* 0.097*
(1+s)pt (0.142) (0.137) (0.073) (0.055) (0.035) (i) 0.025 0.044 0.109
(1+s)p t—1 (0.157) (0.149) (0.072)
((1—i)w)
0.032 0.021
(1+s)p t—2 (0.118) (0.114)
c —0.060 —0.039 —0.028 _o.060* _0.060*
(0.077) (0.060) (0.042) (0.025) (0.025)




Tt —0.001 —0.002 —0.001 —0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
—0.0001
(0.0007)
z 1 1.081* 1.079' 0.972* 0.983* 0.927*
(0.340) (0.335) (0.110) (0.103) (0.078)
—0.153 —0.108
(0.417) (0.398)
3.69 4.06 3.84 0.96 1.19
DW 1.84 1.86 1.84 1.67 1.53
see 0.0096 0.0094 0.0090 0.00e4 0.C083
Not3: Theirtrumertal variables used irestimatthg these equations
are t—2'rt, re_i, rt2, (1+v)(1+v)1, (1+v)_2,'i'
t—2' T,aridT.Other thformatior relevart for redirgthi3ble is
supplied in thNot5 toTable 2.